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Abstract
This paper considers a simple Continuous Beliefs System (CBS) to investigate
theeffectsonpricedynamicsofseveralbehavioralassumptions: (i)herdbehaviour;
(ii) a-synchronous updating of beliefs; and (iii) heterogeneity in time horizons
(memory) among agents. The recently introduced concept of a CBS allows one to
modeltheco-evolution ofpricesandthebeliefsdistribution explicitly, whilekeep-
ing track of the unpredictable nature of individual preferences (Diks and van der
Weide, 2003). As a benchmark model we take a simple CBS, which in a market
with many traders exhibits a random walk driven by news. Using the explicit na-
ture of the dynamics of the CBSwe show that the introduction of herding modies









￿ ) process, which is observationally equiva-
lent to a reduction of the number of market participants. In terms of returns the
model predicts MA(1) structure with a negative coefent. Asynchronous updating





￿ ) innovations, and predicts
a relation between the ARCH and GARCH coefcients. Heterogeneity in memory
leads to long-range dependence in returns. In the empirical section we perform a
modest `reality check' concerning the predicted sign of the MA coefcient and the
relation between the ARCH and GARCH coefcients for exchange rate data.
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ity; Herding; ARIMA; GARCH; Long-range dependence;
JEL classication: C5, G1, D8, F31
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11 Introduction
The current literature on agent based economic models can be roughly divided into
two types: (i) computational nance models and (ii) economic dynamic models. Both
approaches aim to discover what is behind the stylized facts commonly exhibited by
empirical nancial time series.
In computational nance, articial stock markets are used as a tool for simulating
time series of aggregate variables, such as prices, volumes, etcetera (for an overview,
see LeBaron, 2000). To improve the understanding of markets with a large number
of interacting heterogeneous agents, LeBaron et al. (1999) for example developed the
SantaFearticialstockmarket. IntheSantaFemarket,theactionsofagents,whichare
based upon their expectations, are explicitly modelled and traced for each individual
agent. With computers becoming cheaply available and faster, these articial markets
allow for more and more detailed modelling. Although detailed models may possibly
generate more realistic price dynamics, their increasing complexity also makes sim-
ulation less attractive as a tool for the analytic study of the mechanisms linking the
heterogeneity of beliefs with the stylized facts of prices.
The economic dynamics literature follows asomewhat differentroute. There agent
based modelling explicitly aims at an analysis of the joint dynamics of beliefs and
prices (see e.g. Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998). To achieve the necessary analytical
tractability, several simplifyingassumptions are usually made, such as a continuum of
agents who at each time can choose from a nite number of belief types. Typically a
low dimensional deterministic dynamical system is derived, allowing the modeller to
perform a detailed bifurcation analysis, providing insights in the long-run behaviour
of the dynamics for differenteconomic andbehavioral parameters. The natural trade-
off of this approach is that it at best provides an approximation to the deterministic
aspects of the price process of interest. Indeed, the `holy grail' in economic dynamics
is beyond any doubt the heterogeneous agent model that is just as realistic in terms of
its price dynamics as it is tractable analytically.
In previous work (Diks and van der Weide, 2003) we introduced the concept of
a continuous beliefs system (CBS). This framework is built around a continuous be-
liefs space representing the possible point predictors agents can choose from. On this
space a time dependent beliefs distribution is dened, which is updated according to
a continuous choice model. As new market prices become available, the beliefs distri-
bution is updated depending on past performances of strategies. Coevolution of the
beliefs distribution with price dynamics thus arises as newly realized prices feed the
ongoing evaluation of the strategies by the agents. As is natural ina continuous choice
setting, individual choices are considered to be random variables, distributed accord-
ing to the beliefs distribution. The preferences of agents provide an endogenous noise
source whichaffects pricedynamics. Because the randomnessinpricescanbeassoci-
atednaturallywiththediversity ofbeliefs,the latterhas beenlabelleda`naturalsource
of randomness'.
Diks and van der Weide (2003) discuss several scenarios under which the natu-
2ral randomness in prices does not average out in the limit as the number of agents
tends to innity. These include: (i) a disproportionate distribution of market impacts;
(ii) particular combinations of utility functions and predictors, and (iii) dependence
among agents, which may arise for example when agents partly coordinate on a ran-
domvariable, notnecessarilyrelatedtoeconomic fundamentals(`sunspots'). Allthese
examples are based on a violation of at least one of the conditions of the law of large
numbers. In the last case (dependence) it is often impossible to distinghuish between
an innite number of dependent agents, or a nite number of independent agents.





￿ , dened as the number of independent agents required to obtain stochastic price
dynamics with similar stochastic dynamics. For a nite effective number of agents
the dynamics is random by construction. In general, a CBS gives rise to a random dy-
namical system, allowing for the stochastic price dynamics to be described explicitly.
It therefore offers an analytic alternative to the simulation based studies commonly
performed in computational nance.
In sum, a CBS shares several advantages of both computational nance models
and economic dynamic models. Rather than obtaining the stochastic macroscopic
dynamics through laborious simulation, the macroscopic behaviour of a CBS with
agents who can choose among a continuum of alternative strategies, can often be de-
rived analytically. The aggregate behaviour can typically be captured in a few simple
dynamic equations, for an arbitrary number of agents. The analytic tractability can
be used to study features such as the conditional mean and variance of prices analyt-
ically, and relate these to behavioural characteristics.
The objective of this paper is to examine the effects on price dynamics of a num-
ber of behavioral assumptions. We introduce a simple benchmark CBS and expand
it in the following directions: (i) herd behavior; (ii) a-synchronous updating of be-
liefs; and (iii) heterogeneity in the memory of agents. The behavioral models ob-
tained in this way give rise to aggregate dynamics which are represented by well-
known classes of econometric models. At the center is the random walk obtained for
our benchmark CBS. We will show that that: (i) herd behaviour introduces moving av-
erage (MA) structure yielding an ARIMA model; (ii) an ARIMA model with GARCH dis-
turbances is obtained if beliefs are not updated synchronously; and (iii) a fractionally
integrated (ARFIMA) process with long-range dependence is obtained if the memory
of agents exhibits heterogeneity. As an immediate result the parameters of these stan-
dard econometric models can be related directly to the parameters of the behavioral
model.
Near the end of the paper we will only carefully scratch the surface of the possible
empirical applications. This is done by estimating some of the stylized models using
daily exchange rate data. We wish to emphasize honestly at the outset, however, that
while interpreting the empirical results in terms of behavioral parameters, one should
keep in mind that the models are stylized and, for clarity of exposition, deliberately
stripped from a range of features that may become important for a realistic summary
of the data. For example, we are aware of the fact that our natural source of random-
3ness is not the only relevant source of randomness, and that more factors than those
includedinourbehavioral modelmay beresponsibleforMA and/orGARCHstructure
in the empirical data. Although omitting additional relevant model aspects will surely
bias our parameter estimates, we consider comparing the signs of the estimated pa-
rameters with those expected from our theory a sensible `reality check'. If successful,
such an empirical validation may hopefully open doors to more detailed empirical
assessments in the future.
Finallynotethatinherentinourapproachistheassumptionthattheagentsbelieve
in structure in prices that can be protably exploited by `technical trading rules' sum-
marized in terms of point predictors, which we will refer to interchangeably as strate-
giesorbeliefs. Empiricalevidencesupportingthisbeliefinpredictabilityintheforeign
exchange markets is provided by e.g. Sweeney (1986), Taylor and Allen (1992), Levich
and Thomas (1993) and LeBaron (1999). Furthermore, our approach is entirely built
aroundtheheterogeneity ofbeliefs. Somearguments forexpectations beingheteroge-
neous have been provided by,among others, FrankelandFroot (1990). Ina theoretical
exchange rate model, Frankel and Froot (1988) particularly employ the heterogeneity
of expectations to explain some of their empirical ndings.
In the following section we briey review the basic concepts of a CBS. The intro-
duction of the benchmark CBS and its extensions are described in section 3. In sec-
tion 4 the models will be subjected to a basic empirical validation. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Continuous beliefs systems
In this section we briey review the concept of a continuous beliefs system. The main
ingredients for describing the co-evolution of prices and the beliefs distribution in a
CBS are the following. As is common in economic dynamics models, agents are as-
sumed to predict future prices by using a point predictor which is a function of the in-
formationavailableto them (wetypically haveinmindpastrealizedprices). Thepoint
predictors agents can choose from are represented in a beliefs space
￿
, parameterized
by a continuous parameter
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market clearing mechanism. Agents' utility functions and predictors imply individual
demand functions, and the market price is dened to be the unique price
￿
￿ for which
the market clears.1 Of course the appropriate market clearing price equation depends




. , as will be the case in our benchmark CBS, uniqueness of clearing prices is guaranteed.
4on the context, and we will have to provide some additional arguments to justify our
particular choice made for the benchmark model later.
As new prices become available, agents update their evaluations of parameter val-
ues by confronting them with the newly arrived information. As agents have dif-
ferences in tastes and interpret identical information differently they will typically
choose different predictors. This is captured by a continuous choice model, which
denes a probability distribution on the beliefs space
￿
. The probability density func-













￿ individual agents use to base their next prediction on are modelled as






￿ . In this way endogenous randomness





￿ are assumed to
be independent conditional on information available up to and including time
￿ .
To see how the beliefs distribution evolves, let us consider the time when
￿
￿ has
just been quoted. After
￿







￿ . The performance depends on past realized prices and
might for example be based on ex post prediction errors, or the ex post prots realized








































￿ only differences in perfor-
mance play a role. Using this property it can be shown that minus squared prediction
errors are equivalent to risk adjusted prots when agents hold identical beliefs about
conditionalvariances (seee.g.Hommes, 2001). Inpractice, decisions to changestrate-
gies are not based on yesterday's performances only, but rather on the success over a
larger history. Indeed, nancial analysts typically test their candidates on a large sam-
ple of past price history, also known as back-testing. Strategies that have performed
best over some history of the sample are more likely to be selected for future trading.
The simplest way to implement, or mimic, this back-testing is to consider a geomet-
rically down-weighted average of past performances rather than only the last perfor-






































































Given the average past utility the continuous logit model provides the following



































( which we take equal to unity here.
5where
"
￿ is a normalization constant independent of
￿ . The parameter
￿ is referred





￿ is also known as the propensity to err.
If agents are sensitive to small differences in utility, this will be reected by a large
value of







￿ that are independent of









￿ unchanged. With this in mind it is not surprising that risk
adjusted prots and minus squared prediction errors turn out to be equivalent under
certain conditions.










































































which expresses how a new beliefs distribution can be obtained from the previous
beliefs distribution and the last performance measure. The variable
"
￿














￿ can often be fully specied by a nite number of variables such as
its rst
￿ moments, in which case the dynamics becomes nite dimensional. In sum-






















































￿  indicates a deterministic step and 
￿  a step involving endogenous noise.






￿ is determined only by the
performance measure and past realised prices, and otherwise evolves independently
of the individual choices of agents. The beliefs distribution is a convenient concept
introduced in the choice literature to model the fact that agents have idiosyncrasies
in tastes, and that their choices are not identical given identical information. The fact
that identical information is interpreteddifferently by agents is conrmed empirically





￿ used by the agents, from the point of







￿ isastochastic variable, evenintheabsenceofexogenous shocks.
3 A simple benchmark CBS and its extensions
In this section we introduce a benchmark CBS and examine the effects on the dynam-
ics of extending the model in the following behavioral directions: (i) herding, (ii) asyn-
chronous updating, and (iii) heterogeneity in memory. The CBS formulation enables
one to obtain insights into how these behavioral assumptions affect the interaction
between the stylized facts and the unobserved beliefs distribution. The benchmark
model is an extremely simple CBS deliberately stripped from any features that are not
of direct interest. Although taking such a highly stylized model as a reference point
6may seem overly restricted, it claries the exposition and helps to isolate the effects of
each of the extensions.
WewishourbenchmarkCBStobeassimpleaspossiblewhilepreservingeconomic
relevance and bringing out the essentials of the CBS concept. Typically a CBS will be
used for modellingthe joint dynamics of beliefs andprices of well-speciedeconomic
units, such as shares, which are traded sequentially in a large market. Prices in such
marketsaredeterminedbytheexpectations heldbyagentsregardingfuturepricesand
cash ows, as well as their preferences concerning returns and risk. Agents interact
by submitting demand functions depending on expected utility, while their realized
utility is determined by realized market clearing prices. Regardless of preferences, it is
clear that better abilities to predict future prices given the information available will
help agents in realizing a higher utility. In this sense the setting resembles an ever
ongoing version of Keynes' beauty contest.
Motivatedbytheseargumentsweconsideraverystylizedmarketmechanismwhich


































￿ denotes the number of agents. Price equations used in economic dynamic
models often involve similar market expectations. Depending on the type of market,
also the risk free interest rate and expectations concerning dividend payments may
enter the price equation. We have in mind agents who are myopic in the sense that
they are concerned only with maximizing their one-step-ahead utility. At each time
then, agents act as if they are entering the market today while knowing that they will
leave the market tomorrow. As a result, only their expectations concerning the next
price and additional cash ows (such as dividends) play a role. Typically, dividend
payments (ifany) are rare andannounced well in advance, which means that expecta-
tions regarding short run prots are driven by expectations concerning future prices,
ratherthandividends. If, moreover, timeintervalsaresufciently short(e.g.onetove
days, see Lehmann, 1991) the interest rates over a single interval are sufciently small
for agents to consider their predicted future price to be a `fair price' today as well. Un-
der those conditions, if we assume agents to be mean-variance optimizers the market
clearing price is given by the right hand side of Eq. (5).3
The simplest continuous class of point predictors consists of a continuous range
of different constants. We incorporate this by saying that agents with belief
￿ predict
3A mean-variance optimizing agent with belief


































. is his demand and
￿ is a risk aversion parameter times the per-







￿ . Maximizing this with respect to demand
￿





























￿ is homogeneous among agents, the unique equilibrium price is


















































￿ , which in a large market is equivalent to Eq. (5).







































￿ can then be considered
to be a measure for the degree of heterogeneity. Forecast surveys of foreign exchange
market participants, for example, indicate that such a dispersion of beliefs indeed ex-
ists, as found by Frankel and Froot (1990). An argument they provide in favour of het-
erogeneity is the high trading volume observed in the foreign exchange market, since
it takes differences of opinion to trade.
For the performancemeasure we take minus squared prediction errors (Eq. 1), and
memory is included in the utility function through Eq. (2). Having observed and com-
paredoverallperformance, allagentssubsequently adapttheir beliefs. Thenewdistri-
bution of beliefs is determinedbymeans of the continuous choice model, andis given
byEq.(3). Because theutility functionisaquadraticfunctioninthebeliefparameter
￿ ,
it follows that, for all


















































































































In the long run
￿
￿







, and the dispersion of beliefs thus
tends to a constant proportional to the propensity to err. If the propensity to err is
high, agents are less sensitive to differences in performances of strategies. As a conse-







into the dynamics for the average belief
￿






















Having derived the dynamics for beliefs, we now shift focus to its interaction with















































For simplicity, we consider the system in the limit as the number of agents tends to in-
nity. In the absence of dependence among agents, the law of large numbers applies,






























































Together with the `dynamics' of the mean
￿

































Thus in the absence of uncertainty, the price will be constant at all times.
Exogenous shocks, such as news, are assumed to affect the price equation only
through the expectations of agents. This assumption appears natural, since the only






















































Upon substituting the rst of those equations in the second, it can be seen that
￿
￿
follows a random walkdrivenby
￿













andthe newsthat has become available beforetime
￿ .4 Intermsof increments wethus

























The random walk model is consistent with the efcient market hypothesis (EMH)
and has been traditionally viewed as the model for nancial variables, such as asset
prices and exchange rates. Indeed, the random walk has long been considered un-
beatable, a view epitomized by Malkiel (1990). Only recently it seems that it has to
give in to a growing list of statistical evidence against the EMH, some of which is col-
lected in Lo and MacKinlay (1997). As a consequence we see that more sophisticated
models have begun to make their appearances. Kilian and Taylor (2001), for exam-
ple, introduced an exchange rate model which is close to a unit root process near the
fundamental, but in which the exchange rate is driven back to the fundamental when
their difference becomes too large. They report empirical evidence supporting pre-
dictability of exchange rates at long horizons, but at short horizons exchange rates are
hard to distinguish from a random walk.






























. . In that case
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If the conditions for the lawof large numbers (LLN)are not satised, the pricedynam-
ics may be stochastic in a large (many trader) market even in the absence of exoge-
nous uncertainty. In the introduction we brieymentioned a numberof such `sources
of randomness' that might cause the LLNto fail. These are addressed in more detail in
Diks and van der Weide (2003). Here we will focus on the dependence among agents
arising from herd behaviour, as a source of `natural randomness'. It turns out that suf-
cient correlation betweenthe agents willindeedviolate the conditions for the LLNto
apply.
In the literature many different denitions of herding have been described. The
type of herding we wish to address is that where conditional on public information,
the strategies used by the agents exhibit dependence. In particular we have in mind
situations whereagents herdto publicallyannouncedopinions ofothers. Duringeach
period some `early' agents reveal their expectations, allowing other agents to adapt
theirexpectations towardsthose ofthe`leaders'beforesubmittingtheirmarketorders.
This type of herding is `concurrent' in that it involves agents coordinating simultane-
ously on common signals. Concurrent herding is different from studies that associate
herding with for example informational cascades or learning (see e.g. Bikhchandani
et al., 1992; Avery and Zemsky, 1998 and Nelson, 2002). In informational cascades
uninformedagents try to mimic, or learnfrom, the more informedby extracting infor-
mation from realized prices. This type of herding therefore has a `sequential' nature.
As one would expect, having in mind `concurrent' or `sequential' herding makes a dif-
ference. For example, Nelson(2002)ndsthat `high correlation amongagents' actions
does not necessarily implyherding'. As inour modeldependenceamongactions must
originatefromdependenceinstrategies, wewouldrefertosuch correlationamongac-
tions as herding by denition.
Possible motivations for (concurrent) herding are numerous. First note that ac-
cording to Kandel and Pearson (1995), even though each individual typically has his
own interpretation of public signals only few behave completely independent. A mo-
tivation is that being too different from the rest can be risky and might jeopardize
career perspectives or reputation (see e.g. Trueman, 1994 and Scharfstein and Stein,
1990). Hong et al. (2000) have recently strengthened these arguments by providing
some empirical evidence in favour of them. When delving into experience, they also
nd that younger analysts forecast closer to the average forecast, and that they are
more likely to be terminated when they deviate from the consensus.
Evenwhenaccurate(shortterm)forecastingistheonlyobjectiveagentshave,herd-
ing might still be rational. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), as an oblique remark not that:
...investing is also driven by group psychology, which weakens the link between in-
formation and market outcomes. Indeed, note that in our benchmark CBS prices are
entirely driven by speculation (group psychology).5 Froot et al. (1992) have given the
5Lux (1995) is another paper that considers the possibility where agents pay more attention to each
other than to the fundamentals. He assumes a market in which initially only optimists and pessimists
10thought more attention, and concluded the following. In the short term, speculative
forces may be stronger than those of the `underlying economic system'. As a conse-
quence, price series generally show uctuations around the fundamental, where one
can always nd short periods in time where prices exhibit divergence. In such peri-
ods it is thus rational to coordinate on speculative behaviour (herding) rather than on
fundamentals.
Kirman (1993) describes herding as arising from a process, which involves agents
that make choices rst, `recruit' other agents to make the same decision. There are
severalpossibleformsinwhichthis recruitingtakes place, whichwewillnotdelveinto
here. Whatisimportantforourmodelisthattheremaybemechanisms that introduce
dependence among the strategies selected by the agents. The `recruiting' scenario is
an example mechanism which gives just this type of dependence in our model.
Herding towards a leading agent can be implemented easily in a CBS by introduc-
ing interaction terms into the utility function.6 For simplicity we assume that there




￿ denote the parameter value announced publi-
cally by the leading agent, which we assume to be distributed according to the orig-












































































can be considered as a measure for the desire of agents
to select a parameter value close to that of the leader. Straightforward comparison
of coefcients of powers of
￿ in the exponent with those in Eq. (6) gives the following















































In the latter relation the time indices have been dropped as
￿
￿
￿ was already known to
be constant over time (see Eq. (7) and the discussion thereafter).
Undertheassumptionthatmarketweightsofindividualagents(includingthelead-






















































+ is a sequence of independent standard normal ran-
dom variables.
can be distinguished. The evolution of the number of optimists is completely determined by the num-
bers of optimists and pessimists that surround individuals. At a later stage he assumes the presence of
a fundamentalist.
6See Diks and van der Weide (2003), where social interaction is incorporated in a CBS, in analogy
with Brock and Durlauf (2001) who consider social interaction in a dynamic discrete choice setting.
11If we incorporate the dynamics for the average belief
￿
￿ , which is given in Eq. (8), it








































￿ . Since this function is increasing in
￿
and takes values between
￿
and













































￿ . As herd behaviour acts to affect the effective number of agents,
it should come as no surprise that a change in the extent of herding
￿ can not be dis-
tinguished from a reduction of the number of agents in the CBS. Only their joint effect
can be identied.7
At this stage all stochasticity in the model can be associated with endogenous un-
certainty. That is, the randomness observed by the econometrician reects the ran-
domnature withwhich individualagents select beliefsfrom the distributionof beliefs.
If in addition we include independent, identically distributed (IID) exogenous shocks
￿




















































+ is a sequence of IID standard normal random variables,























































The equivalence of the two representations in Eq. (14) follows directly from compar-
ingtheauto-covariance functionsofbothrepresentations. Whilebothrepresentations
7Diks and van der Weide (2003) related the amount of endogenous noise to both the mar-
ket impact of agents, and the correlation between agent's decisions. The effective number of










































￿ represent their market im-
pacts, and where


















12describe the same ARIMA(0,1,1) model, the reduction from four to two parameters
shows that the rst representation was over-parameterized. The original (behavioral)
model parameters can therefore not be identied all independently. For an introduc-
tion to ARIMA and related models we refer to Mills (1999).
It is worth noting that we have established a link between behavioral nance and
econometric modelling. As a direct result, one can associate the parameters from the
econometric model with economically relevant and/or behavioral quantities. In this
particular example, the scale of the endogenous noise appears in the econometric
model as the product
￿
￿
￿ of the dispersion
￿ of the beliefs distribution and the herding
parameter
￿ , while
￿ measures the size of the exogenous noise.
3.2 A-synchronous updating
So far, as is also common in economic dynamic models based on discrete choice, we
have assumed implicitly that the time scale on which agents re-evaluate strategies is
short with respect to the trading time. It seems reasonable to assume that in the ab-
sence of costs for evaluating and updating beliefs, every agent will indeed decide to
update every period. However, if updating is either time consuming or costly, agents
are likely to update less frequently. Hong et al. (2000) found empirical evidence sup-
porting this view. In their empirical study they concluded that inexperienced analysts
revise their forecasts more frequently than experienced analysts.
In general, if the time scales on which agents review strategies is longer in prac-
tice than the clock rate at which prices/exchange rates are quoted, the dynamics of
both prices and the distribution of beliefs will be affected. Indeed, Brock and LeBaron
(1996) nd that time series with more realistic properties, such as strong persistence
of volatility, are obtained in the case of less frequent updating. The effects of the time
scale forevaluations canbeincorporatedinthe modelinseveralways. Onemighttake
the approach of Brock and LeBaron (1996) where all agents update their beliefs all at
once with a certain xed probability per time unit.
An alternative approach, which we will follow here, is to assign a probability
￿ that





agents do update their belief, at each time step. The latter is generally more difcult
to implement, since it implies that the beliefs distribution becomes a mixture with
weight





























































































￿ represents the up-to-date distribution ofchoices that wouldbemadebased







partly based on old information. In simple cases, however, where the mean and vari-
ance of the mixture depend on the past utility only through the previous mean and
13variance, aclosed formupdatingruleforthe newmeanandvariance canstillbegiven.
This is demonstrated in the following example.
The average belief and the dispersion of beliefs among the agents that have de-














￿ is still constant over time. The











￿ . Using Eq.(16) it can be veried that the dynamics of the rst two moments of










































































































































































Thus the dispersion of beliefsexhibits uctuations whenagents donot move together,
evenwhenthedispersionofbeliefsamongthose whoadaptisconstantineachperiod.
The movements are driven by the differences in average beliefs between those who
decide to adapt and those who wait.






































￿ is the time varying standard deviation










+ . Note that



























































































































































































































































+ is described by an ARMA(1,2) process. Interestingly, and in con-
trast with our previous example, the (conditional) variance of the disturbances is no
longer constant. The conditional variance is proportional to the dispersion of beliefs,
which now exhibits endogenous uctuations. Intuitively, these uctuations in the de-
gree of heterogeneity can beascribed to the differencesin opinionbetween those who
decidetoupdatetheirbeliefsandthose whobelievethatupdatingcanwait. According
to Eq. (19), the dynamics of heterogeneity is described by an autoregressive process
of order one, from which one may correctly expect a GARCH(1,1) model to emerge for
















































































































































































































# , so that the resulting GARCH process is stable.
3.3 Heterogeneity in memory
In this section we consider the third and nal behavioral extension of the benchmark
model: heterogeneity in memory. As the diversity in future time horizons seems rele-
vant, also the diversity in past time horizons may play an important role in the co-
evolution of prices and beliefs. With past time horizons we refer to the history of
price observations used to test candidates for future trading. Agents who are more
concerned with price behaviour on the short-term are more likely to compare perfor-
mances over a smaller sample of recent observations than agents who have a clear
interest in the long-term dynamics. Another reason for agents to use small memory
parameters might be that they believe that the world they live in is inherently non-
stationary, and only recent performances can be considered relevant.
Recently, a number of studies addressed the issue of different (future) time hori-
zons among agents (see e.g. Muller et al., 1997; Dacorogna, 2002). This generalization
is supported by the observation that agents trade at different frequencies. That is, the
population of traders often consists of both long-term traders and short-term traders.
Heterogeneity inagents' time scale are believedto be responsiblefor a numberof styl-
ized facts. Long term traders naturally focus on long-term behavior of prices thereby
neglecting uctuations at the smallest time scale, whereas short-term traders are not
15concerned with price movements on the long-run but rather aim to exploit short term
predictability. The effects of the diversity in time horizons on price dynamics have
beenstudied byLeBaron (2001)inanarticial stock market model. Heconcluded that
the presence of heterogeneity in horizons may lead to an increase in return variability,
aswellasvolatility-volumerelationshipssimilartothoseofactualmarkets. Dacorogna
(2002) found evidence supporting trading horizon heterogeneity to be responsible for
the slow decay of correlations found empirically.
In the case where the memory parameter










# , the most recent beliefs distribution for each memory
























































are known, for example, it is possible to derive analytic expressions for some of the





￿ , of the beliefs distribution. This is
demonstrated in some examples below.
Let
￿











￿ represent the rst two mo-
ments of the beliefs distribution corresponding to agents with memory parameter
￿
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￿ , and that































































































































































￿ stands for the expectation with respect to the distribution of the memory




￿ . For a large but nite number of agents,

















￿ is a measure for the scale of endogenous noise which can either result from





+ a sequence of indepen-
dent random variables with mean zero and unit variance (cf. Eqs (12) and (20)). From












































































































































































































￿ (see e.g. Linden, 1999, who studies the aggregated AR(1) process with uniformly dis-
tributed coefcients). As the latter does not decay exponentially when
￿ tends to in-


























































































￿ on the left handside should beinterpreted in terms of its
power series in
￿ .









































































































17Although we will leave a detailed analysis of the dynamics for some of these more



















































































Similar processes, when driven by IID normal innovations, are known as fractionally









￿ the latter is invertible and stationary, and
the autocorrelation coefcients are negative (see Hosking, 1981), a property which is
commonly observed in exchange rate returns, for example. Although Hosking refers
to these processes as beingshort-memory, both the autocorrelation function and par-
tial autocorrelation function decay hyperbolically to zero. Therefore fractionally inte-
grated brownian motion is often referred to as being long-range dependent (see e.g.
Campbell et al., 1997). The fact that we nd a related process is in line with the results
of Granger (1980), who showed that aggregation of simple processes with different
characteristic time scales can easily lead to long memory.
However, considering
￿




￿ of beliefs among agents using the same memory parameter
￿ converges to a constant
￿
￿ , the belief parameters
￿
￿ for agents with different mem-
ory parameters
￿ are centered around different values of
￿
￿ , which depend on
￿ . The
conditional variance of the
￿




















































































































￿ is given by Eq. (23). The rst term on the right hand side can



















































































￿ , it seems that this term cannot be expressed in a form which permits simple
18recursive updating as new prices
￿
￿ become available. It does however show that the
dispersion of beliefs among agents obeys a non-trivial time dependence in the pres-
ence of heterogeneity in memory, and that the second moment of the innovations
governing the price dynamics will exhibit a likewise complexity.
4 Empirical validation
As a framework for modelling the stochastic dynamics of prices and beliefs explic-
itly, the CBS aims to make insightful how the stylized facts of observed prices may be
traced back to the unobservable diversity of beliefs, and vice versa. In the previous
section we examined the specic role of three different behavioural aspects. By keep-
ing the basic CBS as simple as possible, the three extended behavioral models were
shown to relate directly to familiar econometric time-series models. The basis of the
models was found to be the ARIMA model. Interestingly, a-synchronous updating of
beliefs was found to translate into GARCH-type structure, andlong range dependence
(or long memory) emerged for agents employing different time horizons in evaluating
past performance of beliefs (i.e. heterogeneity in memory).
As an immediate result, we nd that the parameters of these well-known mod-
els from econometrics suddenly have an economic and behavioral interpretations at-
tached. Although tempting, interpreting these hidden behavioral parameters directly
from the data seems optimistic in this stage. We are aware of the fact that several
relevant behavioral model aspects and economic variables have been ignored. The
addition of relevant other features to the model is likely to affect the GARCH struc-
ture, or to alter the long range dependence. Our models do not capture, for example,
longer range effects as described by Taylor and Allen (1992). Note, however, that the
idea that the degree of fractional integration is a proxy for the degree of heterogeneity
in memory nds support in Dacorogna (2002).
In this light there is little interest in focusing on the exact values of the parameter
estimates. However, it will be interesting to see whether the signs of the MA coef-
cients and roughly the size of the GARCH parameters are both consistent with what is
predictedbythe theory i.e.the stylizedCBSes. Findingnegativevalues forthememory
parameter, for example, is likely not to win support for our CBS. The predicted effects
of the behavioral assumptions are put to the test in this empirical validation. Focus is
in particular on the model obtained in the presence of a-synchronous updating (see
section 3.2, Eqs. 21 and 22). The ARCH and GARCH coefcients that emerge in that














￿ denotes the probability
for each agentto update his belief at anygiven periodintime. This behavioural aspect
of the model thus predicts a relation between the ARCH and the GARCH coefcients,
which can be checked empirically. Moreover, the model predicts a negative MA(1) co-
efcient equal to
￿
￿ . Herebywe have set memory to zero, leaving us with a model that
is more tractable, but also with one degree of freedom less. Keep in mind, however,
that in the case of herding we also predicted a negative MA(1) coefcient, equal to
￿
￿

































































































































Table 1: Estimates of an MA(1) model with GARCH(1,1) disturbances for six exchanges rate





￿ non-negative (Eq. 15), implying non-positive MA coefcients, as found in all cases.
(see Eq. 13).
The data used to illustrate the model are quotes from the foreign exchange market.
We consider the daily exchange rate of the US dollar against the local currencies of six
different countries. Five of these countries are European: Belgium, Germany, Finland,
France, and Austria, while the last is from South East Asia, namely Singapore. Let
￿
￿
denote the amount of US dollars one can buy for one unit of the local currency at time
















￿ denotes the dailylog returnonthe exchange rate. Thesample period, from
5-11-1987 until 5-11-2002, includes a total of 3914 observations.
Table 1 reports the estimates of an MA(1) model with GARCH(1,1) disturbances for
all six of the exchanges rate returns. The rst three columns list the actual estimates,
whereas the fourth column reports the implied upper limit for the ARCH coefcient
i.e. the upperlimit impliedbyour behavioral model which predicts a relation between
the ARCH and GARCH coefcients (see Eq. 22, and the discussion following it). Ac-
cording to the latter equation, a GARCH coefcient of








￿ . A rst look at these results shows that the size of the estimated
ARCH effect indeed satises this criterion obtained in the case of a-synchronous up-
dating of beliefs. With only one degree of freedom, namely the extent to which beliefs
are updated in an a-synchronous fashion, it should not be surprising that the exact
size of the estimated MA coefcient is not consistent with the (G)ARCH parameters.
Apart from having set
￿ to zero, the setup is also stylized in other respects. With that
in mind, it is encouraging to see that the signs of the estimated MA coefcient are also
consistent with what we would expect from the theory. In sum, in light of all limita-
tions, weconsidertheempiricalvalidationsuccessful andhopethatitmayopendoors
to more informative empirical assessments by means of more sophisticated CBSes.
5 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper was to make insightful how certain behavioral features may
render some of the well-established stylized facts of observed prices. In order of treat-
20ment, we considered: (i) herd behaviour; (ii) a-synchronous updating of beliefs; and
(iii) heterogeneity in the time horizons (memory) of agents. The adopted framework
is that of the Continuous Beliefs System (CBS) (see Diks and van der Weide, 2003).
We used two qualities of a CBS that are particularly useful. First, it enables modelling
the evolution of the distribution of beliefs in an explicit fashion. Second, it does so
by relating the unpredictable nature of prices with that of the unpredictable nature
of individual preferences. In sum, we used the fact that a CBS allows for describing
the stochastic dynamics of both prices and beliefs explicitly by means of a Random
Dynamical System.
By keeping our benchmark CBS illustrative but deliberately simple, the stochastic
dynamicsofeachofthethreebehavioralmodelswasshowntocorresponddirectlytoa
model well-known from time-series econometrics. We came across ARIMA, ARFIMA,
and GARCH. This marks our rst result, as the stylized facts for which these models
are celebrated may now be traced back to the hidden features of beliefs which we hold
responsible. Here, the ultimate simplicity of the benchmark CBS helped us to isolate
the role of each of the three behavioural features considered.
As we summarize the results for the three models seperately, keep in mind that our
point of departure was a model in which the degree of heterogeneity is constant, and
where price dynamics is described by a random walk. For each behavioral extension
we investigated how it modies both the dynamics of prices andthat of heterogeneity.
The effect of herd behaviour is roughly that of reducing the number of agents in
the market. As such, it increases the amount of endogenous uncertainty, and thereby
the level of volatility. Moreover, it adds moving average structure, leadingto anARIMA
specication in levels or MA in differences. Notably, it does not alter the dynamics of
heterogeneity. The latter remains constant.
Fluctuations do enter the dynamics of heterogeneity when we allow agents to up-
date their beliefs at differentfrequencies. These uctuations are found to be driven by
the differences in average beliefs between those who decide to evaluate and update,
and those who believe that updating can wait. If endogenous uncertainty persists in
the market, for example as a result of herd behaviour, a time-varying degree of het-
erogeneity results into a time-varying level of volatility. The extent of persistence in
volatility is governed by the likelihood that individual agents delay the updating of
their beliefs. This result nds support in an earlier study by Brock and LeBaron (1996),
who saw the persistence in volatility of simulated price returns rise to a more realistic
level when allowing for less frequent updating. Interestingly, we obtained an explicit
description of how the updating of beliefs interacts with the volatility process. For our
stylized but yet intuitive example we found the dynamics that to be exactly that of a
GARCH(1,1) model.
Heterogeneity in the time horizons (memory) of agents was found to enrich the
dynamics of both the rst and second moment. Assuming a distribution in memory
rather than identical memory for each agent, we encountered one more stylized fact,
namely that of long-range dependence. Leaving aside the volatility process for a mo-






! ) distribution for memory, we obtained the well- known
21fractionally integrated process documented by e.g. Hosking (1981) for the rst mo-
ment. When delvinginto greater detail, we quickly stumbled upon greater complexity.
In particular, the degree of heterogeneity was found to move in mysterious ways. Al-
though theheterogeneity amongthose whoemployidenticalmemoryisconstant over
time, additional dispersion of opinions is present which can be attributed exclusively
to the fact that not all agents operate at the same time horizon. The latter does not
only add to the overall degree of heterogeneity, it was also found to be time-varying.
To understand the complexity, note that the supply of uctuations is provided by
the dispersion of average beliefs across groups of agents that are operating at different
time horizons. As memory plays an important role in the updating of beliefs, we nd
that the evolution of average beliefs for each of those groups of agents interacts differ-
ently with the price dynamics, given that their memories are different. Heterogeneity
being driven by the diversity of these evolutions, it requires aggregation of these dif-
ferent dynamics to obtain the dynamics of heterogeneity. The latter, although inter-
esting, easily becomes convoluted.
At the end of the paper we included a modest empirical validation to address the
intimate relation between our behavioural models andthe more familiarmodels from
econometrics. As a corollary, the parameters of these time-series models now have
an economic and/or behavioural interpretation attached. For example, our stylized
model predicts a relation between the ARCH and GARCH parameters. Merely as a
`reality check', we veried whether both that relation, and the signs of the other coef-
cients, nds support in the empirical data. In light of all simplications, we consider
the empirical validation successful, and hope that more informative empirical assess-
ments by means of more sophisticated CBSes can be made in the future.
As a nal remark we would like to comment on the difference with the recently
proposed LTLapproach of Brock et al. (2003). Although a CBS ismore explicit in terms
of the beliefs distribution, the price dynamics of a CBS and an LTL are closely related.






￿ (see footnote 2) is normalizable, the LTL coincides with the
deterministic part of the corresponding CBS. However, there are two key differences.
For one, it is not clear how an LTL can be set up with a non-normalizable opportunity
function (which for an LTL corresponds to the pdf according to which strategies are
drawn at random). More importantly, an LTL is a deterministic dynamical system by
construction, and up until now not tailored to dealing with endogenous randomness.
It is exactly the associated stochastic dynamics that plays a leading role in this paper.
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